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THE NEW NEOLIBERALISM
In a july 2015 interview, the former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis gave an insight into his exchanges with the representa-tives of Greece’s creditors at eu Finance Ministers’ meetings. What stood out was his depiction of almost surreal levels of incompre-
hension: ‘You put forward an argument that you’ve really worked on—to 
make sure it’s logically coherent—and you’re just faced with blank stares. 
It is as if you haven’t spoken. What you say is independent of what they 
say. You might as well have sung the Swedish national anthem.’1 The 
promise of a common European public sphere, bound together by rea-
soned deliberation, which has enamoured liberals for over two hundred 
years, appears broken. The post-war reconstitution of this project, which 
placed the Common Market at its heart, has reached its limit, as many 
of its former enthusiasts now accept. Varoufakis’s comment is sympto-
matic of a new strain of political dissent that cannot be simply classed 
as critique. Rather, it is an expression of bewilderment that dominant 
forms of economic regulation persist, apparently impervious to evi-
dence, evaluation or the merits of alternatives. Once critique is no longer 
even heard or recognized, critics may as well say anything.
One result of this seeming irrationalism from above has been the vin-
dication of unreason from below. The British performance artist Mark 
McGowan, also known as ‘The Artist Taxi Driver’, exemplifies this in 
his YouTube videos. McGowan sits in his car in wrap-around shades, 
unleashing his fury at austerity measures, political elites, tax evaders and 
the senseless social harm that has been enacted since the financial crisis. 
As he gesticulates at the camera on his dashboard, the mood is one of 
disbelief, closer to hilarity than to despair, as if to ask: can this really be 
happening? One of The Artist Taxi Driver’s straplines was ‘This is not 
a recession, this is a robbery’. Allegations of illegal violence are com-
mon in this new culture of protest, as in the ubiquitous complaints that 
#thisisacoup, or Varoufakis’s memorable description of Greece’s debt 
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conditions as ‘fiscal waterboarding’. In the us, The Onion and The Daily 
Show have long offered a model of satirical reporting on the political 
scene. The Daily Mash, a British website, has developed a more specific 
focus on economic nonsense, with articles such as ‘“Getting your name 
out there” to become legal tender’ or ‘Tories to build thousands of afford-
able second homes’. The proximity of these headlines to ‘real’ news 
effectively offers readers a choice of two stories, both equally absurd.
This seeming shift to unreason by the governing powers has been char-
acterized since 2008 by more vindictive varieties of policymaking, which 
often operate outside of the norms of policy evaluation, evidence gather-
ing or public appeal. In the past, neoliberalism has been criticized for 
elevating economic judgements of ‘efficiency’ or ‘competitiveness’ above 
moral judgements of social justice. But increasingly it appears, at least at 
the level of public discourse, that governments are operating outside of 
the norms of judgement altogether. The best example of this is austerity 
itself. History offers scant examples of pro-cyclical fiscal-contraction pro-
grammes that have succeeded in avoiding macroeconomic stagnation.2 
The hypothesis of ‘expansionary fiscal austerity’, put forward by Harvard 
economist Alberto Alesina and enthusiastically cited by a number of 
European political leaders since 2008, only ever proposed that spend-
ing cuts need not necessarily lead to reduced growth. Yet no amount of 
empirical evidence of austerity’s failings seems adequate to derail those 
who pronounce its necessity.
Social policies aimed at disciplining vulnerable populations have become 
equally unbelievable. Under Britain’s ‘benefit sanctions’ regime, welfare 
payments can be suddenly suspended for up to a month on account of 
trivial breaches, without any sense of procedural reason as to how the 
rules are applied. One man had a heart attack on the way to an appoint-
ment, but was nevertheless sanctioned; another lost his benefits for 
going to his brother’s funeral, having been unable to get through when 
he tried to phone the Job Centre. Over a million people in the uk have 
received sanctions for one reason or another. Thousands have died after 
being declared ‘fit for work’ by workfare contractors and having their 
disability benefits cut.3 Labour-market policies now incorporate dubious 
1 Yanis Varoufakis, ‘My five-month battle to save Greece’, New Statesman, 16 July 2015.
2  See Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea, New York 2013. 
3 ‘Patrick Butler, ‘Thousands have died after being found fit for work, dwp figures 
show’, Guardian, 27 August 2015.
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behavioural activation techniques, from neuro-linguistic programming 
to self-marketing slogans. Participants must read out ‘affirmations’, such 
as ‘My only limitations are the ones I set for myself’, which are almost 
comically distant from the reality of those living with low incomes, 
chronic health conditions and dependent family members. 
It might be argued that such policies are not beyond reason altogether. 
Austerity clearly has its beneficiaries in creditor states and financial 
institutions; harsh treatment for welfare recipients serves well-known 
electoral agendas. Yet these trends do seem to exist outside of public 
governmental reason. If Foucault was right to argue that liberal states 
desisted from vengeful, excessive forms of punishment in the 19th cen-
tury, replacing them with expert forms of discipline rooted in detailed 
statistical, psychological and economic knowledge of how to achieve 
optimal outcomes, then contemporary austerity regimes would appear 
to be reversing certain aspects of this. It is no longer clear that the 
social sciences, economics or psychology are being applied in a norma-
tive, methodological, publicly falsifiable sense. Instead, they appear to 
be operating as arms of sovereign power, asserting truths rather than 
discovering them.
Dead yet still dominant?
If today we live under neoliberalism, it is manifestly different from the 
neoliberalism that rose to power in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and 
different again from that which held sway from the 1990s, in the long 
boom preceding 2008. The nomenclature has always been a controversial 
one. It is frequently suggested that the term ‘neoliberalism’ refers to too 
many heterogeneous or contradictory policy dynamics, and is therefore 
useless. Of course, the internal inconsistency of the concept may encap-
sulate something real about the system it purports to capture. Yet there 
is nevertheless something problematic about ascribing governmental 
interventions in 2016 to the same overarching rationality or teleology 
as those of 2001 or 1985. It would certainly appear that neoliberalism 
has entered some sort of post-hegemonic phase, in which systems and 
routines of power survive, but without normative or democratic author-
ity. In this sense, neoliberalism is, as Neil Smith put it, ‘dead yet still 
dominant’.4 But what if the new power forms are not dwindling, as that 
would suggest, but abandoning the quest for hegemony, in Gramsci’s 
4 Neil Smith, ‘The Revolutionary Imperative’, Antipode, vol. 41, no. s1, 2010.
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ethical sense, altogether? What has emerged, I want to suggest, is not 
simply another ‘post’ but a new phase of neoliberalism, which is organ-
ized around an ethos of punishment. This is not the type of punishment 
conceived by Bentham and historicized by Foucault, namely a measured 
science of displeasure. Rather, it is a relentless form that acts in place of 
reasoned discourse, replacing the need for hegemonic consensus forma-
tion. It is this that provokes shock and incredulity in response, captured 
in the notion of ‘fiscal waterboarding’. 
To understand this new phase historically, we need to consider how it 
differs from what came before 2008. From this perspective, it is clear 
that there was not a single epoch of neoliberalism, but two. Firstly, there 
was the spread of neoliberalism from around 1979, which lasted for 
roughly a decade leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall, led by neocon-
servative parties of the right, and notably by Reagan and Thatcher (even 
if Carter and Callaghan had delivered the first blows). Secondly, there 
was the application of neoliberalism which lasted nearly two decades, 
between the demise of state socialism and the global financial crisis. 
Importantly, this was advanced by liberal and ex-socialist parties of the 
centre left, leaving many of these parties now in a state of disarray as 
a result. The epochal distinction I seek to draw is not between modes 
of regulation or varieties of policy as such, but between the ethical and 
philosophical orientations that accompany them. The same instruments 
of state power can carry multiple meanings, at different points in history. 
The telos or a priori principle of a policy is intangible, but exists neverthe-
less in the psychology and mutually understood practices of those who 
implement and live with it. With this in mind, I offer an interpretation 
of the successive ethical philosophies that have provided the neoliberal 
state with its orientation. What has changed since 2008 is not so much 
the techniques of power—which have remained eerily constant—but the 
spirit or meaning in their enactment. 
1. combative neoliberalism: 1979–89
The origins of neoliberalism, as a distinctive political and intellectual 
project, can be traced back to the socialist calculation debate, and Ludwig 
von Mises in particular.5 These foundations indicate something about 
5 Ludwig von Mises, ‘Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth’, in 
Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis [1922], Auburn, al 2009.
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the character of the neoliberal critical reason that would follow. Long 
before Hayek and his allies attempted to construct a positive vision of 
neoliberal government, Mises had signalled the primarily obstructive, 
even destructive, ambitions of neoliberal intellectuals. At the heart of 
his 1920s contributions was the need to discredit the rationality of 
socialism. He set an impossible standard for what a ‘rational’ social-
ist government would need to look like. Focusing on the philosophical 
problem of intersubjective valuation, Mises famously argued that the 
price system was the only conceivable means of converting values into 
commensurable metrics of calculation. Investment in productive capital 
would be irrational without such a system, given the time horizons and 
complexities involved in industrial production. While Mises himself was 
never a central figure in the later ‘neoliberal thought collective’, as Philip 
Mirowski calls it, he offered a model for the critical dismantlement of 
socialist and Keynesian policymaking.6 His style of critique set the tone 
for what would follow: insistence on simple, seemingly obvious binary 
choices between liberal market capitalism and everything else. 
As Mirowski notes, the thinking of the early neoliberals shared aspects 
of Carl Schmitt’s anti-democratic political realism. Their view of ‘the 
political’, present also in the American tradition of neoliberalism that 
emerged at the Universities of Virginia and Chicago, was one dominated 
by the problem of executive decision, which needed insulating from 
short-term populist objectives. Placing executive power in the hands 
of rational technocrats would be the necessary corollary of safeguard-
ing the rationality of the price system. One can also witness another 
classically Schmittian dimension to the neoliberal style of critique: the 
starkness of the choice between market economies and everything else 
introduces a friend–enemy distinction to the field of economic policy-
making. Socialism represented the necessary enemy for neoliberalism 
to coalesce as a political identity.
How neoliberalism developed between the socialist calculation debate 
and the triumph of the New Right in the 1980s is a story that has been 
told elsewhere. Many accounts have stressed the role of think-tanks in 
developing the positive policy platform that Hayek sought to construct. 
Yet it would be an error to forget that this movement was catalysed, held 
together and motivated by a spirit of resistance to non-capitalist political 
6 Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds, The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making 
of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, Cambridge, ma 2009. 
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and intellectual forces. Inspired by examples from the left, it was a 
self-conscious insurgency, a social movement aimed at combating and 
ideally destroying the enemies of liberal capitalism. To the surprise of 
much of the left in the late 1970s, capital was able to re-organize socially 
and politically, just as labour had once done.7 In its applied form, com-
bative neoliberalism involved an array of tactics aimed at undermining 
the possibility of socialism. Anti-labour legislation and sometimes vio-
lent confrontations with trade unions—air-traffic controllers in the us, 
miners in the uk—were chief amongst these. Anti-inflationary mon-
etarist policies and high interest rates had the added effect of driving up 
unemployment to unprecedented levels. Alan Budd, one of Thatcher’s 
economic advisors, later confessed that this was an underlying goal of 
monetarism all along.8 Accelerated military spending by the Reagan 
government placed unsustainable strains on the Soviet economy, while 
masking the lack of private-sector growth in the United States. 
Classically Marxist accounts, such as David Harvey’s, focus on these 
political developments as proof that the neoliberal state is an instrument 
of class power.9 The restoration of the rate of profit, following the infla-
tionary slump of the 1970s, was its abiding purpose, though not one it 
lastingly achieved. But this does not capture the cultural and ideological 
orientation of combative neoliberalism, which was to demolish non-
capitalist avenues of political hope. David Graeber puts this succinctly: 
‘Whenever there is a choice between one option that makes capitalism 
seem the only possible economic system, and another that would actually 
make capitalism a more viable economic system, neoliberalism means 
always choosing the former.’10 The stark binary first introduced by Mises, 
between the rationality of the price system and the irrationality of any-
thing else, has the effect of obscuring all differences that exist between 
systems and cultures of socialism. It obliterates choices between more 
and less effective forms of collectivism, while occluding the various types 
of mixed economy that succeeded during the post-war boom. 
The coherence of neoliberalism as a particular form of critique and 
political practice was therefore invented only in combative opposition to 
7 Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time, London and New York 2014.
8 Daniel Trilling, ‘A “nightmare” experience?’, New Statesman, 8 March 2010.
9 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, London and New York 2013.
10 David Graeber, ‘A Practical Utopian’s Guide to the Coming Collapse’, The Baffler, 
no. 22, 2013.
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socialism, whose destruction, both internationally and domestically, pro-
vided its animating telos. Many of the flagship neoliberal policies of the 
1980s did not ‘work’ in any measurable utilitarian sense. Subsequent 
analysis has shown that uk labour-market reforms, for example, did 
nothing to increase the level of private-sector employment in the long 
run, once the effects of privatization are stripped out.11 But they suc-
ceeded in their more diffuse ethical agenda, of anchoring political hopes 
and identities in non-socialist economic forms. 
2.normative neoliberalism: 1989–2008
What is neoliberalism in the absence of socialism—what provides its ori-
entation or ethical coherence? Neoliberalism’s golden age in the 1990s, 
described by Giovanni Arrighi as the belle époque of America’s global 
hegemony, witnessed a different mode of government. Once the hori-
zons of political hope had been delimited to a single political-economic 
system, the project of modernization became an explicitly normative 
one, of how to render that system ‘fair’. The neoliberal telos became a 
constructivist one, of rendering market-based metrics and instruments 
the measure of all human worth, not only inside the market but, crucially, 
outside it as well. Foucault was one of the first to notice that neoliberal 
intellectuals were not only engaged in a critical demolition of the claims 
for economic planning, à la Mises, but also in a remaking of subjectiv-
ity around the ideal of enterprise.12 Concepts such as ‘human capital’ 
offered a new lens through which to analyse and calculate decision-mak-
ing in non-market contexts. The virtue of markets was their competitive 
quality, which provided a normative procedure through which value and 
knowledge could be ascertained.13 According to this logic, all spheres of 
human activity should therefore be reconstructed around the standards 
of competition, so as to ensure that valuable products, services, artefacts, 
ideas and people were discoverable. The task of government was now to 
ensure that ‘winners’ were clearly distinguishable from ‘losers’, and that 
the contest was perceived as fair.
11 Ewald Engelen et al., After the Great Complacence: Financial Crisis and the Politics 
of Reform, Oxford 2011.
12 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–79, 
London 2008.
13 F. A. Hayek, ‘Competition as a Discovery Procedure’ [1968], Quarterly Journal of 
Austrian Economics, vol. 5, no. 2, 2002.
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In practice, this involved the constant modernization of administration, 
management and accounting. The reforms of public-sector bureaucra-
cies sought to inject a spirit of enterprise into government itself. In 
the uk, the Research Assessment Exercise was introduced in 1986 to 
impose a score on every university department in the country, produc-
ing a ranking from best to worst in research quality. Over the 1990s, 
arts institutions were exhorted to implement new accounting methods 
for capturing value. Cost–benefit analysis, coupled to the neoclassi-
cal language of ‘market failure’, became the tests of legitimate public 
spending. Techniques of strategic audit were invented for ranking the 
‘competitiveness’ of nations, regions and cities. The expansion of neo-
classical economics and auditing into all walks of social and political 
life was a disheartening phenomenon, which stripped non-market 
domains of their autonomous logics.14 It achieved what I have described 
as neoliberalism’s disenchantment of politics by economics. Yet it is 
important also to recognize the normative procedures and constraints 
that this constructs around the exercise of political power. Under such 
conditions, neoclassical economics becomes a soft constitution for gov-
ernment, or ‘governance’ in its devolved forms. Normative questions of 
fairness, reward and recognition become channelled into economic tests 
of efficiency and comparisons of ‘excellence’. Coupled to markets and 
quasi-market contests, the ideal is that of meritocracy, of reward being 
legitimately earned, rather than arbitrarily inherited. 
Centre-left governments were better suited to the pursuit of normative 
neoliberalism, or what was called the Third Way, for two reasons. Firstly, 
as a mode of government aimed at modernizing public institutions 
and intervening in social life, this required techniques, institutions 
and expertise traditionally associated with social democracy rather 
than with conservatism.15 It was a self-consciously progressive pro-
ject, fuelled by a reformist desire to produce a fair society unhindered 
by constraints of culture or tradition. Secondly, higher levels of social 
spending often accompanied the development of this new economistic 
hegemony. The centre left viewed the spread of economic audits as the 
necessary means of achieving value in public services and programmes 
14 See Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, 
Cambridge, ma 2015.
15 This is argued by Pierre Dardo and Christian Laval, The New Way of the World: On 
Neoliberal Society, London and New York 2014.
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in a post-social-democratic age.16 In cases such as higher education 
or the arts, professionals experienced auditing not merely as puni-
tive or panoptical, but as the basis on which they could legitimately 
earn more funding.
Given the constitutional importance of competition within normative 
neoliberalism, its legitimacy has never been threatened by inequal-
ity as such. Its moral vision hung ultimately on the authority of the 
audits, economic tests and methodologies that various agencies used to 
judge and calculate value across society at large. These valuations had 
to retain some a priori status, in order for normative neoliberalism to 
hold together. That distinction was lost during the banking crisis once 
it emerged that systems of audit and economic modelling could poten-
tially serve vested political and economic interests. The discovery that 
auditors and credit raters were also driven by financial incentives helped 
to strip normative neoliberalism of its ideological coherence. Inequality, 
which had been rising in most of the Global North since the 1980s, 
returned as a major concern only once the tests of legitimate inequality 
had been found to be faulty.
3. punitive neoliberalism: 2008–?
Looking back on the first two phases of neoliberalism, it is curious 
that critical theorists and social scientists largely failed to recognize 
one of their defining economic characteristics: the build-up of debt. 
As Wolfgang Streeck shows in Buying Time, there was a phase of 
rising public debt, coinciding with what I have termed combative 
neoliberalism, followed by a phase of rising private debt, coinciding 
with normative neoliberalism. But it was not until after the fact that 
much critical or analytical attention was paid to either of these. While 
financialization was on the rise, it was largely mistaken for other forms 
of immaterial value, such as ‘creativity’ or ‘knowledge’17—concealing 
the political logic of debt during periods of combative and normative 
neoliberalism, which then came dramatically to the fore following the 
global financial crisis. 
16 See Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford 1997.
17 For an interesting mea culpa on this issue, see Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of 
the Indebted Man, Cambridge, ma 2012, pp. 50–1.
130 nlr 101
The transfer of banking debts onto government balance sheets, creating 
the justification for austerity, has triggered a third phase of neoliberal-
ism, which operates with an ethos of heavily moralized—as opposed to 
utilitarian—punishment. What distinguishes the spirit of punishment 
is its post jure logic, that is, the sense that the moment of judgement 
has already passed, and questions of value or guilt are no longer open 
to deliberation. By the same token, it is post-critical. Under punitive 
neoliberalism, economic dependency and moral failure become entan-
gled in the form of debt, producing a melancholic condition in which 
governments and societies unleash hatred and violence upon members 
of their own populations. When debt is combined with political weak-
ness, it becomes a condition for further punishment. Studies of those 
living in poverty with problem debts found a prevalent psychology of 
melancholia, whereby debt exacerbates a sense of self-recrimination and 
the expectation of further punishment.18 Research on public attitudes 
to austerity confirms a similar internalization of financial morality, 
which produces the sense that we ‘deserve’ to suffer for credit-fuelled 
economic growth.19
The policy instruments and practices of punitive neoliberalism have 
strong family resemblances to those that were propagated in neolib-
eralism’s first phases. Britain’s Conservative Party has brought back 
Thatcher-era policies, such as an expansion of the ‘right to buy’ social 
housing, only now extended to tenants of non-profit housing associa-
tions, and anti-union legislation, such as a requirement to communicate 
picketing activities in advance to police and a ban on online balloting 
of members for strike action. These were even described as ‘out of 
proportion’ by the Financial Times.20 It is not immediately clear what 
such measures are seeking to achieve. Judged against most standards 
of orthodox economic evaluation, they are self-destructive. Britain’s 
inflated housing market is already a source of deep structural prob-
lems in its economy and, since 2008, the British economy has lost 
fewer days to strike action annually than at any point between 1900 
and 1990. Greater union density and bargaining power would most 
18 William Davies et al., ‘Financial Melancholia: Mental Health and Indebtedness’, 
Political Economy Research Centre, Goldsmiths, London 2015.
19 Liam Stanley, ‘“We’re Reaping What We Sowed”: Everyday Crisis Narratives and 
Acquiescence to the Age of Austerity’, New Political Economy, vol. 19, no. 6, 2014.
20 ‘uk government crosses the road to pick a fight’, Financial Times, 14 September 
2015.
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likely raise wages, reduce inequality and thereby help promote more 
sustainable growth.21 
The techniques associated with normative neoliberalism also take on a 
newly punitive quality. During times of growth, the spread of audits into 
the public and cultural sectors was experienced as a quasi-consensual 
basis on which to distribute more funds. During times of austerity, 
the same techniques become tools through which to withdraw them, 
producing manifold injuries in the process. Warren Buffett’s famous 
claim, that ‘only when the tide goes out do you discover who’s swim-
ming naked’, is now being forcefully extended to the public and cultural 
realms. The government expectation that public-sector productivity can 
alleviate the losses associated with austerity means that the declining 
mental and physical health of public-sector workers is now one of the 
most significant indexes of fiscal retrenchment. A survey conducted 
in early 2015 found that nearly half of teachers in England had visited 
a doctor for reasons to do with stress, and more than two thirds were 
thinking of quitting; similarly, 70 per cent of junior doctors are consider-
ing leaving the National Health Service, in response to unpaid extension 
of working hours.22 The suicide of Stefan Grimm, a German scientist 
based at Imperial College, London, who had been set a target of research 
income to raise, in a context of increasingly competitive grant contests, 
highlights the types of strain that punitive target-setting can create in an 
age when funds are shrinking. The conflicts and injuries of neoliberal-
ism are now increasingly played out in the somatic arena. The limits to 
austerity are most effectively asserted by disability rights activists and 
striking doctors, who have achieved a level of public support that repre-
sents a genuine worry to the Conservative government. 
Yet the superficial similarity of contemporary neoliberalism to earlier 
phases masks a profound difference: in this phase, it is not at all clear 
why such measures are being introduced, other than out of a desire 
to extract some form of vengeance. The Schmittian worldview of the 
neoliberal pioneers, which pitted free-market capitalism against all 
varieties of non-capitalist system, has mutated into something equally 
21 Florence Jaumotte and Carolina Osorio Buitron, ‘Union Power and Inequality’, 
VoxEU.org, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 22 October 2015. 
22 Matt Precey, ‘Teacher stress levels in England “soaring”, data shows’, bbc News, 
17 March 2015; Denis Campbell, ‘Junior doctors: 7 in 10 to leave nhs if Hunt 
pushes through new contract’, Guardian, 20 October 2015.
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paranoid and simplistic, but now apparently self-destructive. In con-
trast to the offensive against socialism, the ‘enemies’ targeted now 
are largely disempowered and internal to the neoliberal system itself. 
In some instances, such as those crippled by poverty, debt and col-
lapsing social-safety nets, they have already been largely destroyed as 
an autonomous political force. Yet somehow this increases the urge to 
punish them further. 
Representation or repetition?
The crisis of Fordist Keynesianism in the 1970s obeyed a classically 
modern rhythm of crisis, in line with Thomas Kuhn’s model of a para-
digm shift. Economic contingencies elicited a crisis of theoretical and 
regulatory orthodoxy; this produced a period of epistemic and political 
uncertainty, which then created a space for competing theories and pol-
icy ideas to gain credibility. Gramsci’s famous observation in the Prison 
Notebooks, that ‘the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born’, might have well described the mid-
dle years of the 1970s, before the rise of neoliberalism. Today, however, 
the old is not dying, but being revived. 
The structure of historical crisis is mirrored in the grammar of critique, 
in which the semiotic capacity to represent reality is used as a means 
of hastening the transformation of that reality. Representation may be 
employed to highlight the suffering that is latent within the present situ-
ation, or to demonstrate the contradictory and unsustainable nature of 
the impasse. However, the interplay between critique and crisis assumes 
at the very least that all parties are committed to a credible semiotic rep-
resentation, even if this is merely in the service of a new hegemony. But 
what if they are not? This is the problem that Varoufakis highlights when 
he says ‘it was as if one had not spoken’. One way of interpreting the 
apparently senseless violence of punitive neoliberalism is as a strategy 
for the circumvention of crisis and, at the same time, an avoidance of cri-
tique. In place of critical forms of knowledge, which necessarily represent 
the deficiencies of the present, forms of empty affirmation are offered, 
to be repeated ritualistically. These lack any epistemological or semiotic 
aspiration to represent reality, but are instead ways of reinforcing it. 
When political leaders say that austerity will result in economic growth, 
the purpose of such speech acts is to repeat, not to represent. Likewise 
when benefit claimants are compelled to recite slogans such as ‘My only 
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limits are the ones I set myself’, these are plainly not statements of truth 
or fact. They are what Luc Boltanski has termed ‘systems of confirma-
tion’, performative utterances which seek to preserve the status quo and 
to occupy the discursive space that might otherwise be filled by empiri-
cal or critical questions about the nature of reality.
In contrast to the Fordist society observed by Gramsci, power now seeks 
to circumvent the public sphere, in order to avoid the constraints of criti-
cal reason. Increasingly, it is non-representational codes—of software, 
finance, human biology—that mediate between past, present and future, 
allowing society to cohere. Where, for example, employee engagement 
cannot be achieved via cultural or psychological means, increasingly 
business is looking to solutions such as wearable technology, that treat 
the worker as an item of fixed capital to be monitored physically, rather 
than human capital to be employed. The key human characteristics are 
those that are repeated in a quasi-mechanical fashion: footsteps, nightly 
sleep, respiration, heartbeat. These metronomic qualities of life come to 
represent each passing moment as yet another one of the same. 
Underlying the new neoliberalism’s circumvention of critical forms of 
knowledge there gapes the truth it is so anxious to avoid—the absence 
of profitable alternatives to the current, broken model of capitalist accu-
mulation, which it is striving to prop up. Global capitalist development 
has been confounded by its own success: it has brought about massive 
over-capacity in manufacturing, with a glut in production driving down 
profits, combined with a huge over-supply of labour, weakening wages 
and therefore demand. With only the occasional brief uptick, profitability 
rates have been falling, business cycle on business cycle, since the end 
of the trente glorieuses. Underlying this is the drastic failure to achieve 
a viable and profitable model of capitalism since the demise of Fordist 
Keynesianism. The once tacit, and now explicit, dependence of the neo-
liberal model upon the rising indebtedness of public and private sectors 
has been, as Streeck shows, a forty-year-long exercise in kicking the can 
down the road. Ultimately, the function of apparently irrational symp-
toms in today’s neoliberalism is to duck or conceal this realization. 
The founding idea of neoliberalism, dating back to the 1920s, is Mises’s 
argument that there can be no scientific account of human need, 
but only of consumer preference. Until this dogma is refuted by his-
torical experience, it seems inevitable that resistance and conflict will 
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reverberate around policy issues of disability and healthcare, where the 
finitude and fallibility of the human body offers the simplest falsification 
of Mises’s doctrine, while it might yet perhaps contribute to a different 
hegemony altogether. Neoliberalism has become incredible, but that is 
partly because it is a system that no longer seeks credibility in the way 
that hegemonies used to do, through a degree of cultural or normative 
consensus. Sovereign power has always had a circular logic, exercised to 
demonstrate that it can be exercised. Yet today, that sovereignty is found 
in technical and technocratic spheres: policies, punishments, cuts, cal-
culations are simply being repeated, as that is the sole condition of their 
reality. The coercions of post-2008 policymaking are those of a system in 
retreat from both the ideology and the reality of rational public dialogue, 
and the epistemological constraints which that involves. One may offer 
a detailed economic critique, mobilize the vast mass of the country or 
sing the Swedish national anthem, scream or lampoon, but all forms 
of dissent will be treated as equivalent. This, at least, is something that 
satire can demonstrate.
